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FOREWORD
The security partnership with Australia is one of America’s most
longstanding and important. The two nations have fought many
wars together and share a vision of a democratic and stable world.
The war on terrorism has elevated the U.S.-Australian partnership to
a position of strategic significance unmatched since World War II.
But it is important for the United States to understand the limits of
Australian military power and the nature of the political, economic,
and strategic challenges that Canberra faces. Like the United States,
Australia is in the midst of a military transformation and strategic
shift, redefining its position in the Asia Pacific region, and the role
that military power, particularly landpower, plays in its strategy.
In this monograph Dr. Rod Lyon and Professor William T. Tow,
two of the foremost experts on Australian defense policy, assess the
future of the Australian-U.S. security relationship within the context
of Canberra’s transformation and strategic shift. They conclude that
this relationship will remain important and will be strengthened in
some ways―interdependence will be central to Australian strategy―
but they consider the building of large-scale American military bases
in Australia unlikely. The challenge, they note, will be sustaining
political support within Australia for this type of relationship.
The Strategic Studies Institute is pleased to offer this
groundbreaking monograph to help Army leaders better understand
this important security partnership.

DOUGLAS C. LOVELACE, JR.
Director
Strategic Studies Institute
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SUMMARY
Australia is an increasingly important ally for the United States.
It is willing to be part of challenging global missions, and its strong
economy and growing self-confidence suggest a more prominent
role in both global and regional affairs. Moreover, its government
has worked hard to strengthen the link between Canberra and
Washington. Political and strategic affinities between the two
countries have been reflected in--and complemented by--practiced
military interoperability, as the two allies have sustained a pattern of
security cooperation in relation to East Timor, Afghanistan and Iraq
in the last 4 years.
This growing collaboration between the two countries suggests
that a reinvention of the traditional bilateral security relationship
is taking place. At the core of this process lies an agreement about
the need for engaging in more proactive strategic behavior in the
changing global security environment, and a mutual acceptance of
looming military and technological interdependence. But this new
alliance relationship is already testing the boundaries of bipartisan
support for security policy within Australia. Issues of strategic
doctrine, defense planning, and procurement are becoming topics
of fierce policy debate. Such discussion is likely to be sharpened in
the years ahead as Australia’s security relationship with the United
States settles into a new framework.
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THE FUTURE OF THE AUSTRALIAN-U.S. SECURITY
RELATIONSHIP
U.S. alliance relations clearly are undergoing major transitions.
The Australia/New Zealand/United States (ANZUS) alliance has
proven to be no exception. Australian-American ties have reached
a new zenith under Australia’s Coalition government led by Prime
Minister John Howard. Key policymakers in the George W. Bush
administration view Australia as one of Washington’s most loyal
allies.
The real ANZUS story in the post-Cold War era concerns
Australia’s shift from an increasingly independent regionalism
during the mid-1990s to arguably America’s second most important
global ally (after Britain), and certainly its closest security partner
in the Asia-Pacific region.1 The Howard government has departed
from what the respected Australian journalist Paul Kelly has termed
the “establishment orthodoxy,” built up over a half-century of postwar international relations, which was highlighted by three key
policies: (1) a successful engagement with Asia; (2) a constructive
role as a multilateralist state; and (3) a lesser dependence on a “great
and powerful friend” in favor of defense self-reliance.2 It has instead
pursued a post-1996 calculation that bandwagoning with the United
States, as the decisive force in global politics, would best serve
Australia’s national security and economic interests, reinforcing
an Australian cultural identity not always commensurate with
Asian societies. That calculation put at risk Australian gambits
for inclusion in Asia’s increasing institutionalization. The risk has
been acceptable to a Howard government that never adhered to a
vision of linking Australian foreign policy to East Asian regionalism.
September 11, 2001, only strengthened its conviction that aligning
more closely with the United States would reinforce Australia’s
genuine national interests.
The implications of ANZUS future viability in Australia’s
strategic reorientation are assessed here. Section I details three
recent instances of ANZUS strategic collaboration based on
perceived mutual interests. Australian-American cooperation in
East Timor, Afghanistan, and Iraq has arguably led to the closest
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security partnership between the two countries since the ANZUS
Treaty was signed in September 1951. Security relations between
the United States and New Zealand remain more constrained, based
on domestic political sensitivities in the latter country precluding
the reinstitution of enduring and extensive defense cooperation.
Section I, furthermore, highlights the importance of reconciling
ANZUS security objectives with resource allocations at a time when
the U.S. strategic posture has shifted from a focus on fighting two
major regional conflicts almost simultaneously, to one projecting an
unmitigated global posture of preemption and intervention.
Section II focuses on Australia’s changing strategic policy under
the Howard government. Since September 11, this policy has
reflected less idealism and a more “explicit and brutal realism.”3 It
has not, however, been an uncontested transition. Advocates of the
“self-reliant” or “Defence of Australia” (DOA) posture in effect since
1987 vigorously contested the Howard government’s decision to shift
toward a stance envisioning a coalition role for Australia in future
international crises. The DOA advocates adjusted their own position
from primarily supporting continental defense to emphasizing a
“regionalist” strategy, a shift that the “global coalition” faction has
since sharply criticized. This debate encompassed both domestic
political factors and sharp differences among factions in the
Australian policy community on how recent U.S. policy affected
Australia’s overall security interests. This monograph’s second
section traces this debate and analyzes why the globalists have
prevailed. It also offers some warnings (e.g., a change in Australia’s
political leadership or growing budget deficits) on how Australian
and American alliance interests could still diverge.
Section III addresses necessary ramifications for the Australian
Defence Force (ADF) engendered by the shift to a “global coalition”
strategy. It links issues of mission identification and compatibility,
technology transfers, and force interoperability. It focuses on ADF
land forces because this sector of Australian defense capability will
be most influenced by the prevalence of a “coalition first” strategy.
Interviews conducted with key Australian policy professionals
revealed that no real consensus exists on how ADF land forces
should now be structured. Many civilian and military leaders are
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apprehensive that carefully crafted budgetary outlays in the 2000
Defence White Paper may be jeopardized if the capabilities issue is
revisited. But the shift in strategic planning has been so profound
since September 11 that some type of land force restructuring is
inevitable.
Section IV reviews the interactive issues of how U.S. strategic
interests and policies will be affected by Australia’s shift in strategic
posture, and how Washington’s evolving geopolitics in Asia
and beyond will shape the future of ANZUS. Coalition warfare,
peacekeeping coordination, intelligence sharing, and other forms of
land force cooperation must certainly be evaluated in the evolving
Australian-American defense relationship. Equally important is the
type of senior ally the United States is to be for Australia. Finally, the
“New Zealand factor” cannot be ignored for two reasons. First, New
Zealand’s overall defense capabilities have contracted substantially
in recent years, and there is currently little prospect that this trend will
be reversed. It is therefore likely that Australia will be expected to
assume a greater defense burden in the so-called “arc of crisis” from
the Indonesia archipelago across Pacific Melanesia, although New
Zealand’s force capabilities are being reconstituted to assume light
peacekeeping duties in its own neighborhood. A short conclusion
offers some recommendations for maximizing benefits for ANZUS
in light of today’s changing conditions in the Asia-Pacific and the
international security environment.
Our basic argument is that the current Australian government’s
decision to prioritize the strengthening of Australia’s alliance
with the United States has been fundamentally sound. This
bandwagoning approach has yielded dividends that could not be
matched by a strategy more oriented toward “balancing” Australia’s
position in Asia and simultaneous reliance on American security
guarantees. The enhancement of Australian-U.S. bilateral defense
relations secures a credible U.S. extended deterrence commitment
to Australia, indispensable and cost-effective access to American
technology, and the prospect of economic and diplomatic payoffs
that were previously beyond Australia’s reach. The authors
argue that Australia’s strategic role and influence increasingly
are interdependent with American power and capabilities. They
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conclude that a unique opportunity exists for the two allies and
for their military forces to confront successfully future threats and
challenges, both regionally and globally, if Australia and the United
States pursue the doctrinal paths recently adopted.
SECTION I: ALLIANCE COOPERATION:
RECENT PRECEDENTS
Until September 11, Australia generally supported U.S. strategy
directed toward fighting two major theater wars (MTWs) “almost
simultaneously,” as initially defined by the Pentagon’s 1993
Bottom Up Review and more recently espoused by the Clinton
administration’s National Security Strategy of Engagement and
Enlargement.4 Australia’s 2000 Defence White Paper was explicit in
linking ANZUS to that country’s prioritization of regional security:
“For Australia, continued U.S. engagement will support our
defense capabilities and play a central role in maintaining strategic
stability in the region.”5 While no longer enjoying formal defense
ties with Washington, New Zealand, the other original ANZUS
ally, implicitly endorsed Australia’s region-centric strategy in its
June 2000 Defence Policy Framework statement, noting that its main
defense interests included meeting shared alliance commitments to
Australia regarding obligations in the South Pacific and the “wider
Asia-Pacific strategic environment.”6
Even prior to the terrorist strikes in New York and Washington,
however, the U.S. strategic posture was shifting from a region-centric
focus to one more in line with confronting asymmetrical threats in
a post-Cold War global security environment. In congressional
testimony given in March 2000, U.S. Army Chief of Staff General
Erik Shinseki argued that the humanitarian intervention operations
conducted by the Clinton administration demonstrated that the
Army had to:
. . . transform itself into a full spectrum force capable of dominating at
every point on the spectrum of operations. At present, we have heavy
forces that have no peer in the world, but they are challenged to deploy
rapidly. The Army has the world’s finest light infantry, but it lacks
adequate lethality, survivability, and mobility once in theater in some
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scenarios. We must change. The Army’s Transformation Strategy will
result in an Objective Force that is more responsive, deployable, agile,
versatile, lethal, survivable, and sustainable than the present force.7

Australian force planners, in particular, quickly pursued the
implications of this transformation doctrine and the “revolution
of military affairs” (RMA) that underscored it. During 1999 and
2000 they conducted a major review to identify a proper “mix” of
force structure, information technology exploitation, and joint force
integration and interoperability with allied (e.g., U.S.) elements to
shorten conflicts and compensate for Australia’s relatively small
military force in a regional context. While sustaining “defense
self-reliance” was still the paramount strategic means identified
for securing Australian security, the American alliance affiliation
was imposing greater pressure for the ADF to modify its strategy
to the extent it could fight in medium-intensity to high-intensity
conflicts as part of an international coalition and to achieve greater
interoperability with coalition forces. 8
The East Timor intervention that commenced in September
1999 marked the advent of ANZUS security cooperation in matters
pertaining to asymmetric warfare. The Australian-led International
Force East Timor (INTERFET) was relatively successful, yet
subsequent operations in Afghanistan and Iraq have been tactically
proficient but strategically controversial. Several broad lessons for
coalition warfare were derived from these collective operations. One
is that “information operations” tailored to derive psychological
advantage against an opponent were critical.9 Another was that the
rapid deployment of networked combatants was essential in lowintensity conflicts, assigning a premium to strategic lift and close-in
fire support capabilities. Nevertheless, future alliance coalitions
could still face high-intensity conflicts against capable regional
adversaries, challenging both the rationales and credibility of current
global coalition strategies. Force readiness and fiscal expenditures
will need to be balanced in ways that will allow ANZUS forces to
confront a spectrum of diverse conflicts.
In East Timor, Australia contributed 5,500 and New Zealand
1,100 military personnel at the peak of the intervention operation.
This was the largest military deployment abroad for each country
5

since Vietnam and the Korean War, respectively. Together, the
Australian-New Zealand contingent represented about four-fifths
of INTERFET’s early operational capacity and underscored the
reality that middle and small powers spearheading humanitarian
intervention and peace enforcement operations will be expected
to provide major combat forces and deterrence capabilities.10
Although the United States limited its deployment levels in the
peacekeeping force to about 260 military personnel (who provided
communications and logistical support) during Operation WARDEN
(INTERFET’s initial deployment phase), the United States played a
key role after its initial reluctance to become involved. A U.S. Navy
helicopter carrier, the Belleau Woods, carrying 900 marines of the 31st
Expeditionary Unit (normally based in Japan) was dispatched to
deter Indonesian corvettes shadowing INTERFET forces along the
East Timorese coast. The cruiser USS Mobile Bay was also stationed
in the area, supplementing one British destroyer, four Australian
frigates, two New Zealand frigates, and two French frigates as a
coalition maritime force.11 U.S. Secretary of Defense William Cohen
underscored this deterrence posture by warning the Indonesian
government during a visit to Jakarta that Indonesia had an obligation
to facilitate the INTERFET obligation rather than impede it. Other
U.S. defense officials simultaneously warned that the 900 Marines
“could be called to combat duty on behalf of the besieged East
Timorese in an emergency.”12 As the operation gained momentum,
elements from Fort Huachuca, Arizona, deployed at both Darwin
and Dili (East Timor’s capital), established a high-capacity voice and
data communications network for the peacekeepers’ use. Airborne
reconnaissance, the securing of telecommunications, and heavylift transportation were all functions assumed by the participating
American forces.13
INTERFET succeeded because the ANZUS allies, Britain, and
France proved that their forces were interoperable during the initial
and crucial stages of the intervention. As one New Zealand think
tank subsequently observed, such interoperability resulted from
“years of shared training [and] exercising, the standardization of
doctrine and operating procedures and the operating of compatible
equipment.”14 Politically, however, the East Timor episode revealed
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that misperceptions of alliance interests and purview could undercut
years of military cooperation, if not identified and addressed in a
timely fashion. When the East Timorese voted for independence
from Indonesia in August 30, 1999, and pro-Indonesian militias
stepped up their campaign of violence and terror against local
residents, reports surfaced that Australia had pressured the
Clinton administration to deploy up to 15,000 Marines as part of an
intervention force.15 Political exigencies in Washington effectively
barred any U.S. military commitment of that size. U.S. officials were
highly sensitive of the need not to disrupt ties with an increasingly
fragile Indonesian government, and the Pentagon was war-weary
from its humanitarian intervention in Kosovo. The United States
was keen to encourage Australian leadership in East Timor by
“putting the onus squarely on its ANZUS allies to tidy up their
own back yard.”16 Despite an insistence by Australia’s Department
of Foreign Affairs and Trade (DFAT) that “a quite remarkable
degree of consistency and compatibility” prevailed in discussions
over East Timor, speculation in Australia about a new ANZUS
crisis intensified until a common strategy was reached following
discussions between President Clinton and Prime Minister Howard
at the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum heads-ofstate summit convened in Auckland during mid-September.17
John Howard, in particular, came away from Auckland
determined to minimize potential alliance dissension as part of his
quest to rebalance Australian ties from Asia to the United States.
He perceived this as critical, if for no other reason than to avoid
U.S. perceptions that Australia ought to manage future crises in
its own neighborhood as part of its long proclaimed defense selfreliance posture. The election of George W. Bush and the events of
September 11 (which the Australian Prime Minister witnessed firsthand in Washington, DC) provided him with such an opportunity.
Three days after September 11, Australia invoked Article 4 of
the ANZUS Treaty. The Howard government’s decision to do so
was predicated on the “belief that the attacks have been initiated
and coordinated from outside the United States” by the forces
of international terrorism.18 Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
commenced less than a month later (October 7, 2001) and eventually
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involved 68 countries. The United States provided the bulk of
forces and firepower, deploying over 60,000 military personnel in
the Central Command (CENTCOM) theater by late February 2002.
By early March 2002, 17,000 coalition military personnel from 17
countries were deployed in Southwest Asia. Australia provided
about 1,550 troops to the operation, including members of its Special
Air Services (SAS) contingent, who were instrumental in providing
critical intelligence that prevented remnants of Taliban and al Qaeda
elements from re-grouping. New Zealand deployed between 30 and
40 SAS troops to Kabul after Washington reversed its earlier rejection
of New Zealand’s October 2001 offer to contribute to the operation.
More recently, New Zealand has contributed P3 Orion maritime
surveillance support for the counterterrorist Maritime Interdiction
Operation in the Arabian Sea and Gulf of Oman, and committed 100
military personnel to the provincial Reconstruction Team in Bamian,
Afghanistan, to engage in social and political reconstruction. Both
ANZUS allies eventually deployed several aircraft, naval elements,
and other military hardware to the Afghan campaign or, in New
Zealand’s case, to interdict hostile shipping in the Persian Gulf.19
Still, it should be noted that the contributions of each state were
made in an independent context, and not as a formal multilateral
commitment under ANZUS. A similar pattern characterized force
commitments from U.S. allies in Europe. Although NATO invoked
Article 6 of the Washington Treaty, American reluctance to conduct
operations within NATO’s organizational structure meant that
forces were contributed by individual states and placed directly
under U.S. command.
The Iraq conflict in March-April 2003 was far more divisive than
either East Timor or Afghanistan (where humanitarian and antiterrorism sentiments were strong enough to generate widespread
support for military action). As “middle powers” that had
traditionally sought United Nations (UN) authorization to resolve
international conflicts (e.g., the Korean War and the first Gulf War),
both Australia and New Zealand were faced with the hard choice
of supporting or opposing American military action against Iraq
without UN sanction. Although the Australian electorate was
divided on the issue, the Howard government opted to extend strong

8

support to the United States and to commit its military to fight beside
American forces in a second major extra-regional conflict within 18
months. New Zealand’s Labor Government publicly opposed U.S.
military action, setting back at least temporarily what progress it had
made in repairing defense relations by its participation in Operation
ENDURING FREEDOM.
Australia instituted Operation FALCONER to supplement
U.S. Operation IRAQI FREEDOM designed to remove Saddam
Hussein’s regime from power and to neutralize any remaining
Iraqi weapons of mass destruction (WMD) capability. Australia
maintained deployment of two to three frigates and P3C Orions as
part of the Maritime Interdiction Force that assumed the specific
mission of securing the southern sea approaches to Iraq (especially
around the Aw Faw Peninsula, providing naval gunfire support for
British land forces and engaging in mine clearing operations) after
the advent of hostilities in March 2003. Australia also deployed a
squadron of FA-18s to conduct close air support and ground attack
missions in southern Iraq, and C-130 transport aircraft to facilitate
logistics operations within the theater. It dispatched 150 SAS
troops to provide advance intelligence for combat operations and
to pinpoint targets for air strikes against Iraqi missiles, installations,
and other hostile targets, and also provided additional commandos,
helicopters, and an incident response team.20
Almost all of the 2000 Australian military personnel involved
in Operation FALCONER were either removed or on their way
home by May 1, 2003, when President Bush officially declared the
end of hostilities. The political dividends reaped by the Howard
government as one of the two allies that supported U.S. operations
with ground, air, and maritime forces, however, appeared to be
significant. Calling Howard a “man of steel” during the Australian
Prime Minister’s visit to his ranch in Crawford, Texas, during
early May 2003, President Bush observed that “Australia came to
America’s aid in our time of need, and we won’t forget that.”21 The
Bush administration clearly placed a premium on alliance loyalty.
After earlier inviting the derision of critics in his own country and
throughout Asia for characterizing Australia’s strategic posture as
one of a “deputy sheriff” to American global interests, Howard
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had emerged as a prescient geopolitical seer, positioned to extract
substantial and enduring benefits from the ANZUS affiliation,
including the culmination of a wide-ranging bilateral Australia-U.S.
free trade agreement by the end of 2003 or early 2004.
By contrast, New Zealand had endangered what minimal
strategic ties it still shared with the United States by indulging in
ill-considered public diplomacy against the Bush administration
over the Iraq war. Prime Minister Clark observed that the conflict
would not have happened if Al Gore had won the 2000 American
presidential election. Forced to apologize subsequently for this
remark, Clark was chagrined by U.S. Trade Representative Robert
Zoellick’s observation that “there’s been some things done recently”
that would make a free trade agreement with New Zealand harder
to get through the U.S. Congress. Clark’s third-ranked minister, Jim
Anderton, claimed in response that the United States was adopting an
unfair and bullying attitude toward New Zealand reminiscent of the
ANZUS nuclear crisis, and noted that “New Zealand’s sovereignty
is not negotiable.” Opposition parties united with some of Clark’s
own coalition partners in government to urge reconsideration of
this stance, since New Zealand’s economy depends on world trade
and requires access to large U.S. markets. By mid-June 2003, Clark
had pledged 60 military engineers to assist in Iraq’s reconstruction
of roads, bridges, and buildings. The U.S. Ambassador to New
Zealand suggested early the following month that relations could
be repaired to the point where the countries could once more call
each other “allies” without necessarily entering into a pre-1980s
type defense relationship.22 New Zealand’s oscillating reactions
to successive crises in recent years nevertheless contrasts sharply
to the Howard government’s consistent posture of supporting U.S.
global interests, even if Washington is seen by Canberra at times to
reciprocate less than it would like (i.e., in East Timor or on specific
trade issues such as agricultural protection).
These episodes of military intervention show that Australia’s
tangible participation in America’s evolving global strategy has
yielded substantial policy benefits for the Howard government.
Further, they show that U.S.-Australian military cooperation
has developed a cadence and predictability that bodes well for
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future joint operations. In the short space of 4 years, Australia has
transformed its ANZUS relationship from one where Washington
viewed Canberra primarily as a “Pacific-centric” ally to a security
relationship that is now regarded by the Bush administration as
one of the significant components of U.S. global strategy. During
a recent visit to Australia, U.S. Deputy Secretary of State Richard
Armitage observed that Australia is “increasingly . . . a critical player
on the world stage. This is true even if some Australians perhaps are
uncomfortable seeing themselves in that particular light.” 23
The recent evolution of what many observers term an
“Anglosphere” global coalition reflects this sentiment. The Bush
administration has made clear that it puts greater emphasis upon
coalitions than upon alliances. Western Cold War alliances are, of
course, not otiose. One of their principal benefits is that they usually
contain the world’s most professional military forces, and those
forces will be central to achieving victory in a prolonged campaign
against transnational terrorism. But the debate about intervention
in Iraq between members of the Western alliances in early 2003
underlined just how uncertain those alliances have become as a
long-term guarantee of Western security.
It is sufficient to note here that at a time when many Americans
perceive the very survival of their way of life at stake in the Global
War on Terrorism (GWOT) and by the challenge of rogue states,
Australia has projected the image of timely, if selective, leadership
and reliable partnership with the United States in waging that
conflict. Cultural and historical affinity has facilitated this image but
the substance and style of the Howard government’s decisionmaking
has been the critical variable in sealing this intensified bond. By
contrast, New Zealand’s more qualified and uncertain postures have
reinforced Washington’s already strong disillusionment with New
Zealand―the other ANZUS member, but one that remains ostracized
from American strategic cooperation due to its tendency to project
criticism rather than loyalty and support at critical junctures in
contemporary U.S. geopolitics.
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SECTION II. ANZUS AND AUSTRALIAN
STRATEGIC POLICY
The ANZUS alliance celebrated its 50th anniversary on
September 1, 2001, just days before the terrorist attacks in the United
States on September 11. For a succession of Australian governments,
the treaty has provided a foundation for Australian security policies.
During its initial years, the treaty reassured Australians against the
prospect of a revitalized Japan.24 But it also did much more. It
allowed Australia, as a geographic outpost of Western society, to
play a meaningful role in Cold War doctrines of containment and
in protecting a world order that it perceived as important to its
own global interests. It also provided a set of practical benefits for
Australian defense planning and force development by enhancing
opportunities for military training, defense procurement, and
intelligence exchange. For all those reasons, ANZUS has been a
core element of Australian strategic planning for decades, even at
times when Australia has shaped a philosophy of “defense selfreliance.”25
Over the years, the treaty has weathered a number of challenges.
It was tested most severely in the mid-1980s when New Zealand
denied its major ally access to its ports by nuclear-capable warships.
That denial provoked a breach in the relationship between
Washington and Wellington that has never fully mended. Further,
the alliance periodically has attracted criticisms―as have similar
arrangements in other Western democracies―from those within
Australia who have seen it as a mechanism reinforcing an historical
pattern of subservience to “great and powerful friends.”26 Despite
such criticisms, in 2003 the ANZUS treaty appears to have reached
new heights of relevancy. Some of that relevancy is attributable to
a faltering of other alternatives, including ideas about self-reliance.
Some is also attributable to a growing sense of insecurity.
Australia’s sense of security has been diminished by a string of
events over recent years, including:
•

the Asian financial crisis of 1997, which brought to an end the
Golden Age of Asian collegiality;

•

the fall of the Soeharto regime in Indonesia in 1998, bringing
12

on a series of weak transitional governments in one of the
region’s key states, and leaving ASEAN leaderless;
•

the events in East Timor in 1999, which finally resulted in
Australia leading an intervention force into the troubled
territory, provoked Indonesian termination of the 1995
Agreement on Maintaining Security, and drove wedges into
the Australian-Indonesian relationship;

•

the attacks on the United States by Al Qaeda in September
2001, and Australia’s subsequent participation in the coalition
of the willing for military action against the Taliban and Al
Qaeda in Afghanistan;

•

the attacks on the Bali nightclubs in October 2002, which
killed 88 Australians and brought home to Australians their
geographical proximity to the world’s most populous Muslim
nation;

•

the war in Iraq, and the potential for state-sponsored terrorist
use of WMD; and,

•

the growing instability in the Solomon Islands that
underscored the reality of a Pacific “arc of crisis.”

Those events have left Australian leaders more uncertain
about the durability and scope of their emerging regional security
partnerships, and more conscious of the interests they have in a
bilateral connection to the world’s unipolar power. For Australians
more generally, the events have given foreign policy and security
issues an immediacy and a directness that they have not had for
decades.
Key Alliance Drivers.
In official circles in Canberra, the view is firmly held that the
Australian-U.S. security relationship is probably in the best shape
in its history. Officials and policy analysts view the relationship
in a “new light,” citing a range of factors, some global and some
domestic. There is Australian agreement with Richard Armitage’s
previously cited observation that Australia, through its recent
13

activities, has moved to the first tier of American allies. So too is
there agreement that the ANZUS alliance, which during its Cold
War days always had a reactive, regional cast, has moved towards
being an alliance with global reach and a proactive agenda. Where
differences arise is on how Australia should adjust to this sea-change
in alliance identity and function.
At the global levels, two factors have been critical in driving this
reformulation of ANZUS: the growth of a unipolar international
environment, and the events of September 11. Australian policymakers see the United States comfortably positioned as the global
leader. And they judge that the United States will remain the global
leader for a protracted period, certainly well into the 21st century.27
The importance of this judgment should not be underestimated: in
past decades, there has frequently been a debate about the longevity
of American power, and that debate is now―essentially―over.
American global preeminence faces no near-term challenge, and the
bilateral relationship between Canberra and Washington is seen in
Australia as an opportunity rather than as a threat.
Some Australian officials also view American primacy in
ways that suggest an important revaluation of the international
environment has taken place. The belief that the global system can
be managed by mechanisms of inclusion, such as the UN, is now less
accepted among Australian policymakers. The events of September
11, and the subsequent bombings in Bali on October 12, 2002, have
been important in driving Australian leadership perceptions away
from idealistic visions of the global system and towards more hardheaded and realistic assessments.
Of course, the events of September 11 have also generated a new
set of security concerns related to political instability. American
determination to respond to terrorist groups that threaten its vital
interests is not in dispute. Australian policymakers see a new
focus and commitment to the projection of American power; a new
strategic purpose to Washington’s global engagement that will―over
the medium term―lead to a substantial repositioning of American
forces and facilities at both the global and regional levels. This
committed America will be a more demanding ally for Australia.
But among Australian policymakers there is an acknowledgment
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that the comfortable, reactive, responsive strategies of the Cold War
are no longer appropriate for the new strategic environment.
Alongside the transformed strategic environment, Australia’s
renewed engagement with its Western alliance partner owes much
to the position of Prime Minister Howard in the domestic political
milieu. The political leadership’s commitment to the “new light”
illuminating the alliance relationship is undoubtedly stronger than
the broader public’s commitment. The public at large supports the
alliance, but hesitates regarding its future directions and is uncertain
about the implications for Australia.28 By contrast, Howard seems
willing to devote his energies and resources to reconfiguring the
alliance for a new era, and capable of bearing the political risks that
such a course will entail.
Some Australian officials also speak of Australia’s continuing
impressive economic growth as an important determinant of a
larger strategic role. As the Australian economy continues to
show good growth figures over a long period, when many of
the world’s major economies have been stagnant, it has offered
Australian policymakers both a larger sense of Australia’s role in
the world and the resources necessary to underpin an expanded
role. The Australian intervention in East Timor in 1999 constituted
a harbinger of that larger role; in the post-September 11 world an
expansive policy of Australian global and regional engagement―in
Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Solomon Islands―is even more evident.
All of these factors have been important in driving Australia
towards an energetic level of strategic engagement, made more
noticeable by the hesitancy of other, larger, Western allies to
become part of the coalition of the willing in Iraq. This heightened
level of engagement, however, has brought into sharper and more
contentious relief the doctrine, force structure, and procurement
plans currently underlying Australian defense policy.
Strategic Doctrine.
At the doctrinal level, the move by Australia towards becoming
a “global” ally rather than merely a regional one has reignited a
long-standing debate about the proper focus for Australian security
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thinking. Since at least the Dibb Review of 1986, important parts of
Australia’s strategic doctrine have emphasized a “concentric circles”
approach to Australian security and defense priorities. Under that
model, the Australian homeland constituted the first and most
important “circle” for defense planners. The near region―reaching
out to about Singapore―fell within the second circle. Further “circles”
moved progressively outwards to embrace Northeast Asia and the
Middle East, and even more distant parts of the globe. Central to the
concentric circles vision of Australian defense was a principle that
geography was a key determinant of strategic importance, and that
the proximity of a threat to the continental landmass determined―
broadly―the priority to be accorded the threat.29
The doctrine assigned priorities for a particular purpose: it
provided the basis for defense planning, shaping the ADF, and
guiding procurement. Because the sea-air gap to Australia’s north
was seen as offering a critical “moat” that would complicate the
task of any invader, naval and air assets were treated as providing
key capabilities for interdiction.30 The army was reduced to the
role of a “goal-keeper”:31 it had to be capable of defeating smallscale incursions that succeeded in establishing beach-heads on the
continent, but it was actually seen as the least important of the three
services. Army chiefs were reduced to arguing about the importance
of island-seizure within the sea-air gap as a critically undervalued
component of defense planning.32 Peter Leahy has written of the
consequences for Australia’s land force of the Defense of Australia
approach: “we gradually lost strategic agility; our units became
hollow; and our ability to operate away from Australian support
bases declined to a dangerous degree.”33
The entry of global terrorism to the agenda of the ADF, and the
new pattern of alliance engagement to counter political instability,
have forced a revaluation of doctrine, planning, and procurement.
Defence Minister Senator Robert Hill publicly indicated that
such a revaluation was under way in a seminal address to the
Australian Defence College in June 2002, when he suggested that
the concentric circles approach to thinking about Australia’s defense
was outmoded.34 Hill has been more explicit about this point than
other ministers, in part perhaps because he has held the Defense
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portfolio for only a brief period of time. All of the other ministers
who sit on the National Security Committee of Cabinet―the Prime
Minister, Deputy Prime Minister, Foreign Minister, Treasurer, and
Attorney General―were members of the committee during the
writing of the 2000 White Paper on Defence, and had a close role in
setting the tone and direction of that document. Still, the committee
has shown increasing divisions over defense policy since the
September 11 events, so Hill was hardly a lone voice in arguing for a
reconceptualization of Australian defense.35
Constraints.
What are the major constraints to the future of the alliance? Here
it is important to remember the earlier definition of the key drivers of
the reinvigoration of the alliance: more proactive Australian strategic
behavior, sustained Australian economic growth, the intensification
of international unipolarity, the impact of September 11, and John
Howard’s domestic political strength.
During 2002-03, Australian forces have been deployed to 14
different intervention and peacekeeping operations in the world,
including Bosnia, the Middle East, and the Asia-Pacific. Australia
has dispatched 1,500 troops to the Solomons, still retains around
1,000 personnel in East Timor, and “has more troops and police in
more places in the Asia-Pacific region than at any other time―in
roles that include combat, policing, monitoring, and training.”36
Continued strategic cooperation raises Australia’s standing in the
eyes of its American superpower ally, but also raises expectations.
Comments by Armitage and other American officials about
Australia’s new “global” defense role signal a possible tendency
by Washington to assign its comparatively small Pacific ally too
much credence as a military power and to generate excessive
pressure for Australia to participate in every substantial coalition
operation that the United States undertakes in a post-September 11
world. Reports of Australia resisting U.S. pressure exerted during
mid-2003 to contribute to future Iraqi peacekeeping operations
illustrate the physical limitations upon such a strategy of proactive
engagement.37
A second impetus for a larger security role was a stronger
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Australian economy, and that must also be seen as a constraint.
Expanded ADF deployments entail budgetary difficulties and
procurement challenges for the ADF. ADF operational demands
have commanded an increased share of the total defense funding
base as combat-oriented force imperatives increasingly outpace
support requirements (by early 2003 the ratio was about 65:35―a
major shift from the two-thirds support budgets pursued during the
mid-1990s).38 In August 2003, the Australian Defence Department
reported a projected $12 billion funding shortfall in its long-term
capital equipment program over the decade to 2010―a factor
that has led independent commentators to conclude that the $50
billion defense capability program originally outlined in the 2000
Australian Defence White Paper is “undeliverable, unaffordable, and
uncertain.”39
The Australian defense budget might still have some upside in
it, but it must reflect the overall health of the Australian economy.
Defense spending as a percentage of gross domestic product (GDP)
is still low, in part because the defense increases outlined and
approved in the 2000 White Paper have been affordable from GDP
growth. But the government is cautious about any dramatic longterm increase in defense spending, uncertain of the actual level of
public support during a decade when the nation’s “baby boomers”
will be starting to move into retirement and impose higher costs on
welfare budget items.
The third and fourth drivers―the intensification of international
unipolarity and the impact of September 11―combine to form a
further policy constraint. Australia is at pains to shake the “deputy
sheriff” image it accrued throughout much of East Asia during
the East Timor campaign. Its participation in the coalition of the
willing’s campaign against Iraq in early 2003 will only intensify that
image in the eyes of various Islamic groups in Southeast Asia and
elsewhere that are highly critical of American power and policies.
One Australian academic has argued that a primary assumption in
Canberra―that “it is merely common sense to cling tightly to the
coattails of the most powerful state in human history as it seeks to
right the wrong done to it after September 11”―is offset by more
globally widespread ambivalence about the wisdom of a strategy of
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asymmetrical warfare. Australia must pursue a foreign policy that
is “precise, coherent, and decisive” and “must think seriously about
the negative and dangerous implications of [its] association with the
U.S . . . while maintaining a pragmatically useful relationship.”40
The fifth and final constraint relates to prospects for leadership
change in Australia that could disrupt or reverse the marked
strengthening of Australian-American alliance ties over the past
few years. John Howard is already 64. His time left at the top of
Australian politics is limited. His logical successor, Treasurer Peter
Costello, is a solid figure and a long-term member of the National
Security Committee of Cabinet, well-versed in the key issues of
Australian security. But the loss of Howard at the policy helm would
still be noticeable. Costello, in the days immediately after the Bali
bombings in October 2002, was the Cabinet minister who spoke out
publicly in favor of a closer Australian engagement with Asia, at a
time when some of his colleagues were warning that Southeast Asia
had become a more difficult and dangerous place for Australians.
Perhaps even more worrying on the political front is the absence
of any major leader―with the exception of ex-leader Kim Beazley―in
the ranks of the Australian Labor Party, currently in the opposition,
who champions the alliance. Among the younger generation of
Labor leaders coming up through the ranks, there are few who
might provide the party with the long-term commitment to the
bilateral security relationship with Washington that Bob Hawke and
Kim Beazley extended during the 1980s. Labor’s Shadow Foreign
Minister, Kevin Rudd, is a possible exception. In a comprehensive
article on ANZUS appearing in Australia’s major international
relations journal 50 years after the founding of the alliance, Rudd
concluded that “ANZUS continues to be of central relevance to
Australian interests for the foreseeable future.”41 But Rudd has also
criticized the Howard government over alleged excessive reliance
upon the alliance as “the single pillar” for Australia’s national security
policy, and insisted that Labor’s security policy would be built upon
“three pillars”: the alliance, the UN, and a policy of comprehensive
engagement with Asia.42 The “three pillars” argument is typical of
Labor’s approach to the alliance in the 1980s and 1990s and, as Paul
Kelly has noted, may now suggest an enduring attachment to an
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older understanding of the alliance rather than to the reinvigorated
relationship.43 Although Rudd was able to distinguish between
Australia’s “adherence to the alliance and engagement with the
[Asian] region” as not “mutually exclusive propositions,” a number
of his Labor colleagues have been less prone to recognize this policy
nuance.44 In short, bipartisan support for Australian security policy,
if not carefully nurtured, could well decline, and it will not be
possible to shield the ANZUS treaty from such a trend. Indeed, for
some of its most strident critics, disparaging the alliance represents
a target of opportunity too good to miss.
Australia’s overall strategic policy direction bodes well for the
future of ANZUS. Its shift from a concentric circles posture to one
reflecting a more balanced approach between global and regional
contingencies, many of which involve asymmetrical threats, is
compatible with the U.S. force structure reorientation toward fighting
more low intensity conflicts against hostile nonstate actors and
occasional mid-to-high intensity conflicts against “rogue states” or
other anti-Western forces.45 Australia’s new proactive defense identity
in Southeast Asia and the South Pacific and, even more centrally, its
willingness to participate in American-led military coalitions even
without UN support, correlate directly with traditional American
concerns about allied loyalty and defense burden-sharing. Latent
policy hazards such as leadership disillusionment or economic
pressures could yet create future ANZUS crises. Over the nearterm, however, such developments appear unlikely as the nature
of currently emerging threats predicate closer rather than qualified
security cooperation among the world’s developed states and as
Australia endeavors to reconcile its international security objectives
with finite resources and capabilities.
SECTION III. FORCE STRUCTURE
RAMIFICATIONS FOR THE ADF
As Australia’s doctrine of concentric circles has begun to break
down, so too has any national consensus on force procurement. The
GWOT has re-opened issues of low-tech versus high-tech options for
Australian force planners. It has also rendered uncertain the carefully
negotiated 10-year procurement plan that the 2000 White Paper had
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tried to lock into place. In particular, it has helped to reposition the
Australian army against its service rivals, the navy and the air force.
The more political instability has become identified as the key threat
to Australian security, the more the perception has grown that the
answer to political instability is essentially a larger and more capable
land force. More “grunt on the ground,” as one media commentator
put it,46 would offer advantages in offsetting political instability that
are simply unattainable by aircraft operating at thirty thousand feet.
As a direct result of that belief, Australian ministers have begun to
see a much higher level of future dependency upon the service that
was short-changed for 20 years under the old doctrine.
That new level of dependency was reflected in the key decisions of
the government’s Defence Capability Review, released on November 7,
2003. The Review affirmed that the defense of Australia and regional
requirements would remain the primary drivers of force structure,
but identified a range of capabilities necessary to strengthen the
army’s effectiveness, sustainability, and deployability. One media
defense correspondent observed that “the big winner from the
review is the army which will now get the firepower, air-mobility
and network-centric communications it considers essential for 21st
cetury warfare.”47 While the Review confirmed major naval and air
procurement plans, the public debate in the months preceding its
conclusion suggested important divisions within cabinet on many
of the central issues. The Treasurer, for example, was warning in
August 2003 that the Joint Strike Fighter was not yet a “done deal,”
and stating that the Collins-class submarines would never have been
built if Australian defense planners in the 1980s had foreseen the
crises in East Timor, Afghanistan, Iraq, and the Solomon Islands.48
How might the shape and size of the Australian army change
in coming years? Some officials and analysts posited a minority
opinion that the government ought to consider a 50 percent
expansion in the size of the army (to nine brigades from its current
six). Others would be happy with a six-brigade army that achieved
proper manning levels. The argument for a larger army relates
to land forces’ increased responsibilities in an era of intensified
terrorism and heightened prospects for Australian ground forces
being deployed to intervention missions within and beyond
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Australia’s immediate region. The government’s May 2003 decision
to assign 1,200 reservists to a new Reserve Response Force designed
to react quickly to terrorist strikes and contingencies illustrates
the manpower problem incurred by a regular army force of about
26,000. That force currently deploys five line infantry battalions (of
approximately 750 soldiers each), one commando battalion, and one
SAS regiment.49
An expanded SAS is virtually inevitable, given factors of
increased troop fatigue accumulating with short intervals between
intervention missions. In mid-2003, the ADF was authorized to
recruit an extra 150 SAS troopers and 550 support staff by 2006,
including the recruitment of qualified civilians for the first time
to fill the ranks.50 But opinion remains divided about the wisdom
of placing too heavy an operational tempo upon a small, select
contingent within the larger army. Some critics noted that special
forces should be considered to be the “vintage wine” in the wine
cellar, and that resort to their skills should be limited to special
occasions.
The official line of the Howard government is that Australia
has been and remains capable of deploying a brigade on extended
operations within that country’s “immediate region,” while
simultaneously deploying a battalion group to another contingency
offshore or to more distant points. The Army has responded to
this directive by adopting a littoral maneuver concept as part of
its transition from a continental to an offshore force. Maneuver
Operations in the Littoral Environment (MOLE) forms part of the
Future War Fighting Concept released in May 2003. Army Chief
Peter Leahy has argued that the MOLE concept requires land forces
“structured . . . for military success across any likely spectrum
of future conflict,” and thereby allows the Army “to address
the physical defense of Australia, the defense of our immediate
neighborhood and support for our wider interests, as fluid elements
of a single strategic problem.”51 The Future War Fighting Concept,
in turn, is intended to achieve a “Seamless Force” by the year 2020:
a highly integrated and fully operational state between Australia’s
three services (Army, Navy, and Air Force).52
Even more contentious is how the land component of the
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ADF can best be shaped into what General Leahy has termed
a “hardened, more robust and deployable Army.”53 Decisive
firepower and maneuverability at close quarters will be the key to
winning future asymmetrical wars, often fought on complex terrain
such as urban areas (the so-called “three block war” scenario where
deployed troops face different challenges across three urban blocks)
or in environments where combat missions will be combined with
humanitarian ones. There is little doubt that “networked systems”
of infantry, armor, artillery, and air support―combined arms
capability―is the key to meeting such a challenge. But there is much
debate about what is the right combination for such a capability to
reach its optimum effectiveness in this type of warfare, particularly
when working with other coalition forces.
Interoperability and Future Procurement.
Realizing the vision of an ADF Seamless Force relates directly
to issues of interoperability. Clearly patterns of interoperability
established during the Cold War are in transition. In the Cold War
the focus of Australian-U.S. cooperation was with the U.S. Pacific
Command (PACOM), and the Asia-Pacific region was viewed in
Washington’s eyes as essentially a naval and air theatre. The U.S.
Army was committed to Korea, but the broader nature of American
engagement was typically via the Marines in Okinawa, and Subic
Naval Base and Clark Air Force Base in the Philippines. The U.S.
Army, which went backwards out of Vietnam, adopted a Eurocentric
focus. That focus, along with the sheer size and scale of U.S. land
forces, and the “goalkeeper” role of the Australian army under
the concentric circles doctrine, inhibited interoperability between
the Australian army and its American counterpart. Of all three
services, the land forces were the service where interoperability was
underdeveloped by Cold War experiences.
Even now, Australian officials are hesitant about the extent to
which they should even try to enhance interoperability between the
two countries’ armies. The U.S. Marines are more commonly seen
as the natural partner for the Australian army, in part because of the
history of cooperation during World War II, but also because the
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Marines’ natural island and littoral focus, and the structure of their
units, offer greater opportunities for Australian contribution than do
the large, heavy forces of the U.S. Army. A major point in several
of the interviews conducted for this monograph was a concern that
American regular combat and support units are at times too slow
or ponderous to deploy in situations where adversaries take the
initiative in concentrating firepower against lightly manned and
deployed coalition elements. This is related, in part, to the difficulties
that interoperability with U.S. forces imposes upon Australian forces.
Australian forces have long trained to be interoperable with the
predominantly maritime PACOM, but found that in the largely landcentric environment of the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM),
PACOM procedures did not suffice. Australian forces came out of
Iraq aware that they had not yet achieved a seamless blend with the
forces of their major ally―and that their ally’s central commands had
not yet achieved a seamless blend with each other. Still, Defence
Minister Hill has recently made clear that interoperability is one of
the government’s highest priorities.54
As Leahy has noted, the 2003 Iraq campaign was successful as
a coalition operation primarily because of force multipliers being
realized through “real time access [by agile ground forces] to
supporting fire.” Timely introduction of U.S. and British armored
and infantry fighting vehicles was critical in protecting Australia’s
force mobility and providing close support to the ADF in various
terrains.55 This has less to do with force configuration, however, than
with force maneuverability and lethality. Australian officials often
seem daunted by the sheer scale of the U.S. Army. Yet Australian
force planners have few problems in contemplating joint operations
with the U.S. Air Force or Navy, which are also large organizations.
One Australian observer has noted that although “it might not be
entirely clear how services as different as the U.S. and Australian
Armies will cooperate in the future . . . it is clear that they will have
to learn to do so.”56
An important determinant of interoperability at the regional level
will be the contribution made by Australia’s intelligence collection
and assessment agencies. They will need to be able to provide the
sorts of data flows that permit the projection of military capabilities
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and the application of network-centric power. Australia has long
had a recognized position as a key intelligence hub in the Southwest
Pacific and in Southeast Asia. To maintain that status and to enable
intelligence to be a force multiplier in its local region, Australia will
need to maintain the requisite level of investments in its intelligence
communities.57
Entangled within the broader issue of interoperability is the
difficult issue of procurement. Procurement was a major issue
emerging from our interviews. The future of the armored capability
within the Australian army was raised consistently. Although the
2000 Defence White Paper foreclosed tank acquisitions, Australia’s
ageing LEOPARD tanks acquired in 1976 have needed replacing
for years. The question of a tank replacement has now become
emblematic of the debate about the future of the army. Retention of
a seed-bed for developing armor skills among Australia’s soldiers
is important to the future of the force, as it points to the long-term
future of the ADF’s land capability as something other than a
glorified police force. Already the majority of Army’s officers have
little experience in combined arms warfare. One lieutenant colonel
has written only recently of the loss of this skill among a generation
of his colleagues.58
Among the advocates of a replacement for the LEOPARDS, the
preference is for an armored capability at the heavier rather than
the lighter end of the range. From their own tests, Australian army
officers are not drawn towards light-tank options, seeing them as
vulnerable in specific situations and operationally indecisive. Either
the new LEOPARD 2 German battle tank or the American M-1A2
counterpart appears to be the preferred weapon. However, concerns
projected by the air force and navy that a decision to procure such
tanks would affect their own chances for procuring Joint Strike
Fighters (JSFs) or Air Warfare destroyers could undercut army
procurement aspirations at a time when Australia’s defense budget
deficit looms as increasingly critical.59 Under such conditions,
leasing arrangements may become more appealing to a cashstrapped ADF. Still, the recently released Defence Capability Review
accepted the need to replace the ageing LEOPARDs, and suggested
that the government would prefer to purchase a replacement rather
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than to lease such a critical capability.
Australian policymakers are also acutely conscious of the lessons
to come out of Iraq, in particular the high value to be placed upon
network-centric warfare. Australian military leaders were impressed
by the synergies of force that networking allowed, enthusiastic about
the new application of individual communications links and “blueforce trackers,” and have begun to contemplate the future use of
such capabilities by their own units. It is likely that in the aftermath
of the conflict, and in the context of the Capabilities Review,
Australian strategic planners will be drawn into an increasing
reliance on high technology force multipliers, and a much greater
application of network-centric warfare. If that proves to be the case,
opportunities will expand to increase ADF interoperability with U.S.
forces.60 Australian leaders already seem to have decided that unless
there are compelling reasons for redirecting individual procurement
decisions to other suppliers, it would make sense for Australia
to take advantage of U.S. willingness to supply high-technology
equipment to a trusted ally. If this policy is followed for a number
of years, it will both enhance interoperability and make the security
relationship between the two countries even closer.
Current Australian procurement dilemmas must be seen against
a broader strategic backdrop. Australian defense forces were
already confronting a major problem of bloc obsolescence before
the events of September 11. This was in fact one of the key issues
confronting the drafters of the White Paper in 2000, and has not
changed during Australia’s shift from a less continental to more
global defense posture. Many of Australia’s major weapons systems
are scheduled for retirement and/or replacement in the next 10 to
15 years. For some key assets, such as the F-111 aircraft, which are
devouring a disproportionate share of the air force’s maintenance
budget, retirement dates might even be brought forward from those
considered appropriate during the drafting of the White Paper.61
Other key ADF asset requirements, such as greater indigenous lift
capabilities (either military or co-opted civilian units), have become
more urgent since the White Paper.
How these challenges will be overcome remains uncertain on the
basis of current funding trends. The White Paper approved a A$12.8
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billion increase in Australia’s defense spending between 2000 and
2010 and the 2003-04 defense budget totaled A$11.7 billion―a $776
million increase over the previous year. This included a $396 million
increase in capital equipment projects, primarily related to new
tanker aircraft, aircraft electronic self-protection equipment, petrel
mine and obstacle avoidance sonars for ANZAC–class frigates and
$20 million for the Joint Strike Fighter program.62 But the Australian
government foreshadowed possible cutbacks in the number of Joint
Strike Fighters that Australia may eventually purchase from 100 to
around 30, and indicated it had no plans to increase overall defense
spending beyond 1.9 percent GDP. The Australian Strategic Policy
Institute, a government-funded think tank headed by Hugh White,
called this approach the “death of a thousand cuts,” arguing that
defense management practices had to be improved and that hard
choices regarding the ADF’s future niche capabilities inevitably
would have to be made.63
At least two broad implications can be drawn from the above
discussion. First, despite boasting the world’s 15th largest economy
and a successful tradition of “punching above its weight,” Australia’s
capacity to fund a comprehensive and modern force structure will
be tested severely in the rapidly changing international security
environment. In this context, increased jointness in coalition
warfare strategy will enhance opportunities to strengthen the ADF’s
interoperability within its own multi-service framework and with
allied forces. Land force capabilities enhancement will further
facilitate Australia’s willingness to participate in future “coalitions
of the willing” with the United States, but these capabilities will
be constrained by persistent shortages of the SAS personnel, lift
capabilities and close-in fire support systems increasingly required
to fight asymmetrical wars. Sustained doctrinal controversy is likely
to result from this policy dichotomy.
A second implication flows from the first: Australia’s ability
to be a meaningful contributor to future global operations will
rest upon its willingness to sustain a relatively wide array of force
capabilities for a country of its size and natural strategic reach, and
to accept that the quality of the networked forces of the combined
participants will be a key determinant of conflict outcomes. If future
Australian governments modify or revise John Howard’s resolute
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determination to maintain his country’s status as a key U.S. ally
that can play a meaningful role in international security, Canberra
could well revert to a more continental defense posture, reminiscent
of the 1980s and early 1990s. A “worst case” outcome―but one
that is not at all likely―would see the problems of force structure
and procurement become sufficiently overwhelming that Australia
embraces a “strict constructionist” Pacific Doctrine and emulates
New Zealand’s policy of turning inward on the basis of geography
and geopolitical orientation.
SECTION IV. AMERICA’S INTERESTS
AND THE FUTURE OF ANZUS
Much of what Australia does will be shaped by how its senior
American ally perceives and interacts with Australia in an alliance
context. As part of a comprehensive shift in its global force structure
and deployments, the United States is moving away from seeing Asia
just as a maritime theater. It is also moving away from the structure
of its Cold War presence, which saw U.S. deployments focused on
the Northeast Asian region because of the imminence of threats to
Japan and South Korea. Experts now expect that “America’s role in
the region and its military posture there will look very different at
the end of this decade than they did at the start of it.”64 So too will its
basing structure change in important ways. American commanders
increasingly refer to “lily pads” or “warm bases”: small, lightly
staffed facilities for use as jumping-off points in a crisis and outfitted
with the military supplies and equipment to be used by U.S. rapid
deployment forces or heavier elements.65
In part those changes will arise from the dynamics of Asian
evolution, within which Japan may become less important as a
regional player (due to factors of demographics and economics),
even as it pursues a more “normal” strategic posture via
constitutional revision. China will become more important. South
Korea’s continued economic growth is transforming the long-term
strategic contest on the peninsula. And the war on terror has also
refocused Washington’s attention on the large Muslim-population
countries in Southeast Asia.
American security analysts are now much more impressed by
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the sheer diversity of tasks that confront U.S. strategic planners in
Asia. Those tasks include:
• preventing the emergence of a dominant hostile great power in
the region;
• deterring or countering aggression or coercion against U.S.
friends and allies;
• defeating terrorist organizations hostile to the United States;
• preventing state failure and internal conflict; and,
• preventing the proliferation of WMD.66
Those tasks imply a wider geographical spread of U.S. military
assets in the Asia-Pacific region than was common during the Cold
War era, when doctrines of containment kept the United States
focused on the Northeast Asian sub-region. In consequence, U.S.
security analysts―both official and academic―have already begun
to contemplate a new “shape” to the U.S. presence in the region,
a reconfiguration that would offer greater flexibility in addressing
such challenges.
Central to that new configuration will be an ability to cope
with the sheer vastness of the Asian region. Planners point to the
“order-of-magnitude difference in geographic scale” between Asia
and Europe.67 Even allowing for the new capacities that advanced
technologies provide to project power over vast distances from
U.S. home bases, Asian geography constitutes a barrier to the easy
application of U.S. military power. Most potential areas of conflict are
far from current U.S. bases, and some are deep inland.68 Moreover,
not all Asian nations could offer the Americans the facilities that
might help to overcome that geographical barrier. In some places,
paucity of economic infrastructure would offset any gains from
increased access. In others, Muslim-dominated societies might pose
particular social challenges for a heightened American presence.
So as the United States settles into its new configuration of military
deployments, greater cooperation between Australian and American
forces will likely be one of the options that U.S. security planners
will want to explore. Press speculation in the Los Angeles Times in
May 2003 about a reallocation of the U.S. marines in Okinawa to
northern Australia seemed premature.69 But Paul Wolfowitz made
clear during travels within the region in June that key decisions still
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needed to be taken on such matters.70 More recently, the Howard
government has begun to signal to the Australian public that it
expects Washington’s reconsideration of its basing requirements
might result in a proposal for some kind of U.S. basing activity in
northern Australia.
U.S. bases, in the strict sense of that term, might be politically
difficult for Australia to digest. In that strict sense, U.S. military
forces have not been “based” in Australia since World War II, and it
might require Australians to believe that a similar level of insecurity
now characterized the current environment before they believed that
such arrangements were necessary. Without such an acceptance, the
establishment of U.S. bases in Australia would risk exacerbating the
current partisan divisions over the military relationship between the
two countries. A strategy would be required for careful management
of the issue. A substantial level of Australian involvement in any
“bases”―similar to that in the current joint facilities―would be
integral to building political support for such an arrangement.
Much would also depend on the actual nature of such “bases.” “Lily
pads,” for instance, which offer rights of passage rather than rights
of permanent occupation, might be more attractive to both countries
than some other options.
What Does the United States Expect from Australia?
Pentagon planners will be anxious not to disturb current patterns
of cooperation that the United States already enjoys with Australia.
For some years now, under existing force structure and strategic
doctrine, Australia has been able to provide to the United States a
range of capabilities that have been both welcome and appropriate
to the tasks confronted. Even on the land force side, Australian
capacities to provide special forces, hospital units, communications
units, and air-traffic controllers, for example, have allowed
Canberra to play to its niche capabilities in its alliance role. Even
were Australian land forces to take on a greater combined-arms
capability, it is not obvious that Australian policymakers would
be rushing to offer an armored brigade for an alliance task. Some
officials in Canberra believe that Australia can already provide a
sufficient range of cooperative military options to Washington, and
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that it will not be under pressure to offer a significantly increased
range of options in future years.
Others say that Washington is looking for a range of post-9/11
security partners to carry more of the security burden, because even
a unipolar power’s military forces can only perform a limited range
of tasks simultaneously. In Australia’s case, this means sustaining
a heightened strategic profile in the so-called “arc of crisis,” ranging
from Indonesia to the north and northwest to the area rife with failed
or failing states in Melanesia. While Polynesia and the broader South
Pacific are also of concern to Canberra, New Zealand is still the most
likely power capable of projecting light peacekeeping forces into that
region, and is the logical spearhead for future stabilization operations
that may be required. New Zealand’s Defence Policy Framework (June
2000) reiterated Wellington’s constitutional responsibilities for the
defense of the Cook Islands, Nuie, and Tokelau; for providing defense
assistance to selected South Pacific states; and for surveillance of
those countries’ economic enterprise zones (EEZs).71 The United
States will have an interest in Australia’s and New Zealand’s closer
defense relations partnership development to enhance South Pacific
security. The Solomon Islands contingency represents a test case in
this regard.72
Peninsular Southeast Asia remains a sector of critical concern for
American force planners increasingly preoccupied with managing a
U.S. Army stretched more and more thinly throughout the Persian
Gulf, Europe, and Northeast Asia. Here Australia can be most
relevant to U.S. counterterrorism objectives by coordinating with
ASEAN governments and policing infrastructures in the areas of
intelligence sharing, offshore patrolling, and forced migration. The
role of the Australian Federal Police (AFP) in facilitating Indonesia’s
arrest of the Bali bombers was a model of regional counterterrorism
at work. According to those interviewed, this precedent could be
readily extended to cover the Philippines and Thailand. Australian
and Singaporean intelligence coordination is also substantial. More
effort is needed by Canberra and the ASEAN states, however, to
build up multilateral venues of cooperation to levels where they can
complement and strengthen the already well-established bilateral
ones. A major challenge will be the extent to which Australia can
become an integral player in ASEAN’s new counterterrorism centre
31

recently established in Kuala Lumpur and, as importantly, to what
degree that centre will assume a credible function in Southeast Asia’s
overall counterterrorism campaign.
Preventing WMD proliferation relates closely to Australia’s
relations with Northeast Asia and, more specifically, with North
Korea. Unlike Washington, Australia has normalized relations
with the North (in May 2000) and, since early 2001, it has been more
consistent in supporting dialogue between North and South Korea
than has the Bush administration. But it has also been forceful in
pressuring Pyongyang to dismantle its nuclear weapons program
and to submit to international verifications as a safeguard against
that program recommencing. Following North Korea’s revelations
about its ongoing nuclear weapons program, disclosed to U.S.
negotiators in October 2002, Australia sent a high-level delegation
of its own to Pyongyang to press for nuclear disarmament and
to reassure North Korean officials that the United States had
no intention of invading the DPRK.73 Australia is also a charter
member of the Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI) designed to
preclude the North Korean transfer of nuclear materials or missiles
over the region’s waterways. This enforcement posture is extended
to other aspects of international security. In April 2003, for example,
Australian Defence Special Operations Forces seized a North Korean
vessel, the Pongyu, near Newcastle in an anti-narcotics smuggling
operation.
Most of the Australian policy officials and analysts interviewed
for this monograph believed that, if a new Korean War were to
erupt, Washington would expect their country to contribute a more
substantial force than the one Australia deployed to Iraq in early
2003. F-111 and F-18 combat aircraft, air-to-air refuellers, and P3C
maritime surveillance aircraft would all play a leading role. At least
part of Australia’s Collins submarine force would be enlisted for
duty, as would special forces and even other selected land forces.74
While evacuation of Australian civilians would be desirable, it seems
unlikely that a “bolt out of the blue” North Korean strike against
Seoul would leave much time or opportunity for Australian forces
to do much more than support U.S. operations designed to bring in
troop reinforcements and relevant weapons systems as rapidly as
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possible.
Prospects for a future Sino-American strategic confrontation over
Taiwan remains the most difficult long-term scenario for Australian
policy planners. China is a key trading partner and an increasingly
influential strategic actor in Australia’s own region. However, it
could never take the place of the United States as Australia’s major
ally due to enduring differences in culture, identity, and values. The
ideal outcome is for Australia never having to “choose” between
China and the United States; indeed, each great power has warned
Canberra that it would expect neutrality or outright support,
respectively, if any such contingency were to arise.75 Ultimately,
Australia would side with the United States in any such conflict,
but its influence with China and other Asian states in its aftermath
would almost certainly be seriously compromised.
Among U.S. officials little prospect is entertained for a
more systematic or closer Australia-Japan security relationship
materializing any time soon. Low-key official talks―the U.S.-JapanAustralia Strategic Dialogue―commenced in 2003 (with the U.S.
Deputy Secretary of State meeting his counterparts in one of the three
countries’ capital city), but the topics covered have more to do with
global security issues (WMD and Iraq’s economic recovery) than
with building an intrinsic trilateral security relationship among the
participants.76 To a much greater extent than Australia, Japan feels
constrained in developing an independent, highly visible strategic
profile for fear that, in doing so, it could encourage the Americans
to rely upon a more “normal” Japan to assume a comprehensive
regional defense burden. The vision held by some American neoconservatives of an “Asian NATO” or “JANZUS” that was noticeably
weighed at the outset of the Bush administration will continue to
languish in the “too difficult” basket for some time.77
In summary, it is very likely that the United States and Australia
will agree to incremental measures for intensifying alliance
collaboration in specialized areas such as more frequent visits of
American combat aircraft and vessels to Australian bases and ports,
larger-scale combined/joint exercises, and expanded cooperation
in such technology sectors as missile defense, unmanned aircraft
and communications systems.78 It is much less likely that Australia
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will provide permanent bases for American forces earmarked to
respond to future Pacific conflicts, due to distance, lack of adequate
infrastructure and political sensitivities. Barring the improbable
scenario of a Sino-American conflict over the next decade or the
introduction of a “sea-change” development along the lines of
September 11, ANZUS will not generate overly arduous demands
on Australia flowing from “excessive” American expectations about
what Australia can or will do.
CONCLUSION
The past 4 years have seen Australia and its major ally establish
a rhythm and cadence to their pattern of security cooperation that
truly justifies characterizing the ANZUS alliance as a “reinvented
relationship.” Levels of security cooperation between the United
States and Australia are already so high that it is difficult to see how
they might get even higher in years ahead. This is particularly the
case because of the constraints that we have identified within the
current arrangements: constraints that include a range of political,
economic, and international factors.
Yet a more intimate relationship is possible. The theme of defense
self-reliance has been superceded by events and new thinking in
Australian security policy. The theme was instrumental in allowing
Australia to cast off its dependency on great and powerful friends in
the 1970s and 1980s, but strategic interdependence is an increasingly
sound strategic recipe for the challenges of the 21st century. The
ANZUS alliance will remain central to Australian security policy for
three key reasons: the nature of the emerging security threat which is
asymmetrical and global; Western defensive technological evolution
towards network-centric warfare; and the inability of autonomous
security policies and “orphan” capital equipment to provide a
competent defense even of continental Australia. Rather, we expect
a doctrine of interdependence must play a larger role in Australian
security policy.
Such essential interdependence will clearly pose serious tests
for Australian policymakers, in large part because self-reliance
previously assumed such a prominent position in the Australian
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strategic lexicon. It makes more necessary the nurturing of a greater
level of bipartisanship within the Australian body politic about the
advantages of interdependence and the imperatives of good alliance
management. The payoff of such an effort will be sustained ANZUS
credibility and viability―an outcome that should advantage both
countries’ ability to anticipate and confront those contingencies that
will inevitably emerge to challenge their shared aspirations and their
security.
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